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The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) governs a range of issues including divorce and property 
distribution on the breakdown of marriage.  The legislation applies to all married couples 
in Australia, and most matters are administered by the same Commonwealth court 
systems.1  Divorcing parties who require property distribution orders are benefitted by the 
scheme’s parity of treatment, and by the range of factors considered by the courts.  To 
secure justifiable economic outcomes, these factors include the parties’ financial and non-
financial contributions to the relationship, and their present and future economic needs.2 
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1  In Western Australia, however, a State Family Court was created to administer the Family Law 
Act 1975 (Cth).  Notwithstanding it is a State Court, it is very similar to the Family Court of 
Australia in terms of the training and experience of its judges as well as the counselling and 
conciliation facilities available:  A Dickey, Family Law, 4th ed, Lawbook Co, 2002, 98-99. 
2  The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s79 gives the court wide discretion to make such order as it deems 
appropriate to alter the parties’ interests in property.  The prospective component, accommodated 
under s79(4), considers financial and non-financial contributions, and present and future needs.  
Some commentators have observed a tendency to underrate non-financial contributions to 
marriages so that unequal weight is given to non-financial contributions in the context of property 
distribution.  Bailey-Harris notes that cases such as Ferraro v Ferraro (1992) 16 Fam LR 1, 47, 
Waters v Jurek (1995) 20 Fam LR 190, 200, and McLay v McLay (1995) 20 Fam LR 239 gave 
greater (acceptable) weight to nonfinancial contributions, but that these cases are not the rule: R 
Bailey-Harris, ‘Equality or Inequality within the Family?  Ideology, Reality and the Law’s 
Response’ in J Eekelaar and T Nhlapo (eds) The Changing Family: International Perspectives On 
The Family And Family Law, 1998, Hart, Oxford, 251, 255. 
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Yet increasing numbers of couples are living together on a permanent basis without 
becoming married.  By 1997 there were 756 500 people in de facto relationships in 
Australia, an increase from 710 800 in 1992, constituting 9.1% of all persons living as 
couples (an increase from 8.5% in 1992).3  As at 1998, it was estimated that 826 300 
people lived in de facto relationships.4  For many, the decision not to marry is motivated 
by personal choice based on religious or other opinion.  Other couples are unable to 
marry regardless of their desire to do so, due to their homosexuality.  In 2001, there were 
19 594 gay couples living together throughout Australia, double the number in 1996.5   
 
Due to constitutional limits on the Commonwealth’s legislative power, the property 
distribution provisions of the Family Law Act do not apply to those in de facto 
relationships.6  Property distribution on the breakdown of a de facto relationship is a 
                                                 
3  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australia Now, Population: Marriages and divorces, 2002: 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/b95347a43cc
81fffca256b350010b3fb!OpenDocument>. 
4  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australia Now, Population, Special Article – Marriage and 
Divorce in Australia, 1998: 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/bf1fa897acba
ea06ca2569de002139bb!OpenDocument>.  It is not claimed that all these relationships would 
qualify as legally-defined de facto couples for the purposes of property distribution since a 
significant number of these would be nascent relationships and so would not meet time 
qualifications, and others would result in marriage.  However, tens of thousands of qualifying de 
facto relationships would not be excluded by these considerations, and would be subject to the 
current legal positions. 
See also Australian Bureau of Statistics, 3310.0 Marriages and Divorces, Australia, reporting on 
22 August 2002 that marriage numbers and rates are declining, the trend towards older age at 
marriage continues, and that the proportion of men and women cohabiting before marriage 
continues to rise.  In 2001, 72% of couples indicated that they had cohabited before marriage, 
compared with 31% in 1981:  
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/b06660592430724fca2568b5007b8619/893c128867
8fd232ca2568a90013939c!OpenDocument>. 
5  N Bita, ‘Out, proud and parents’, The Australian, 16 July 2002, 9, reporting unpublished data from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001 census.   
6  The Commonwealth has power to legislate with respect to ‘marriage’ and ‘divorce and 
matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of 
infants’: Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act s51(xxi) and (xxii) respectively: hereafter 
referred to as the Constitution.  Although not definitively determined by the High Court, the 
prevailing view is that the marriage power is not wide enough to empower the Commonwealth to 
legislate regarding property rights of de facto couples on the breakdown of a relationship.  The 
ambit of the term ‘marriage’ is considered in A Dickey, Family Law, 4th ed, Lawbook Co, 2002, 
37-41.  While the author concludes that the meaning of this term as used in the Constitution 
remains uncertain, dicta from High Court Justices suggests a restrictive interpretation of the term.  
In contrast, Moens and Trone interpret the dicta of McHugh J in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally 
(1999) 163 ALR 270 as suggesting that the power would now extend to the recognition of same 
sex marriages.  If such a wide interpretation is correct, the term would also be broad enough to 
embrace de facto relationships: G Moens and J Trone (2001) Lumb and Moens’ The Constitution 
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matter for State legislation, and legislation has been passed in all Australian 
jurisdictions,7 led by New South Wales in 1984,8 and most recently in Western Australia 
in December 2002.  However, in contrast to the neatness and justice of the Family Law 
Act provisions, these eight statutes are marked by two significant thematic 
inconsistencies: the first regarding the matters that may be considered by the courts in 
exercising its discretion to distribute property, and the second regarding the types of de 
facto relationship protected by the statute.  These inconsistencies produce injustice, since 
different jurisdictions protect different economic interests, and since some classes of 
individual are protected in some jurisdictions but not in others.   
 
Questions arise as to the most justifiable legal response to these problems.  The 
Australian States and Territories desire a uniform scheme for all de facto couples 
implemented through Commonwealth legislation, but to date the Commonwealth has not 
acted on or accepted this consensus, being particularly reluctant to extend a new regime 
to homosexual couples.9  This article first outlines the different Australian positions, and 
argues that this current inconsistent situation should be replaced by a uniform position 
that applies to all de facto couples.  It is then argued that to protect the relevant economic 
interests, the uniform scheme for de facto couples should mirror the legal position 
applying to married couples.  The major issue then becomes whether such a uniform 
scheme should apply to homosexual as well as heterosexual de facto couples.  An 
argument for including homosexual relationships in the regime is made by referring to 
fundamental principles of liberal democracy, international human rights law, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Of The Commonwealth Of Australia: Annotated, 6th ed, Chatswood, Butterworths, 126.  The New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission in its Report 36, Report on De Facto Relationships, 1983, 
31-32, also indicated that there was (in 1984) increasing support for a wider interpretation of the 
term.  If this interpretation is correct, the term would be broad enough to embrace de facto 
relationships.  
7  Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic); De Facto Relationships 
Act 1991 (NT); Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT); De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA); 
De Facto Relationship Act 1999 (Tas); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld); Family Court Act 1997 
(WA) as amended by Family Court Amendment Bill 2001 (WA), which was assented to on 25 
September 2002 and commenced on 1 December 2002.  For the purpose of this article, these 
statutes are collectively referred to as ‘de facto relationships legislation’ although some of the 
statutes govern relationships in addition to de facto relationships.   
8  De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), now renamed Property (Relationships) Act 1984 
(NSW). 
9  See below, n 21, 23. 
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comparative law.  The final issue of whether the scheme should include domestic 
relationships falling short of de facto relationships is also addressed.  In concluding, we 
make some recommendations about the features of a new regime. 
 
 
1.  Differences in Australian State and Territory positions 
Factors considered when distributing property 
Three different approaches are taken regarding the factors considered when adjusting 
property interests.  The most justifiable design is adopted in statutes modelled on the 
Family Law Act, which considers the parties’ present and future needs, and their financial 
and non-financial contributions to the relationship.  This model has been adopted by the 
three jurisdictions most recently passing legislation: Queensland, Tasmania and Western 
Australia.10  Qualifying de facto couples are placed on a similar legal footing as married 
couples.  To qualify, the relationship must have existed for at least two years, have 
produced a child, or have had substantial specified contributions made to it.11 
 
The second, more restrictive approach is taken by the first three jurisdictions to enact 
legislation in this context: New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory.  Here, 
the court is directed to consider only contributions made by the parties, not their future 
needs or other issues that impact on their financial positions.12  Because the earlier 
legislation is narrower than the Family Law Act, in many respects the courts here have 
                                                 
10  See for example Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ss291-292 regarding financial and non-financial 
contributions, and ss297-309 regarding future economic needs; De Facto Relationship Act 1999 
(Tas) s16(1)(a) and (c); Family Law Amendment Bill 2001 (WA) s205ZG. 
11  Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s287; De Facto Relationship Act 1999 (Tas) s13; Family Court 
Amendment Bill 2001 (WA) s205Z(1).  In Queensland and Tasmania, de facto relationships 
legislation is administered by State courts, rather than the Family Court and the Federal 
Magistracy, which deal with matters under the Family Law Act. 
12  In New South Wales, for example, the court must only consider financial and non-financial 
contributions to property and financial resources of the relationship (Property (Relationships) Act 
1984 (NSW) s20(1)(a)); and contributions including homemaking and parenting to the welfare of 
the family or to the other spouse, or to the relationship’s children (s20(1)(b)).  The reason for the 
legislation being so restricted is largely political.  When New South Wales enacted legislation in 
1984, it was groundbreaking reform, and the legislation proposed was highly controversial.  If the 
proposed legislation resembled the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) by allowing the courts to consider 
a wider range of factors in making a property order, the legislation may have been seen to be 
equating de facto couples with married couples, and may have jeopardized the passage of 
legislation through Parliament. 
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been unable to rely on family law cases as precedents.  As a result, property orders have 
been made which differ significantly from similar cases dealt with under the Family Law 
Act.  Here again, a qualification as to duration or circumstance must be met to enliven the 
property adjustment provisions.13 
 
The third method, adopted in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia, falls 
between the first two.  While these statutes do not mirror the Family Law Act to the same 
extent as Tasmania, Queensland and Western Australia, the courts consider a greater 
range of matters than can be considered under the earlier statutes.  Both statutes direct the 
court to consider ‘such other matters, if any, as the court considers relevant’14 and ‘other 
relevant matters’.15  Again, duration and other conditions are imposed on qualification.16 
 
Type of de facto relationship protected 
In the Northern Territory, South Australia and Tasmania, only heterosexual relationships 
are covered.  More recent statutes in Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland extend 
to heterosexual and homosexual relationships.17  In the Australian Capital Territory and 
New South Wales, the position is even wider.  In 1999, New South Wales amended its 
De Facto Relationships Act 1984 – renaming it the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 – 
and expanded its coverage beyond ‘de facto relationships’ to ‘domestic relationships’, 
defined as either a de facto relationship,18 or a close personal relationship (other than a 
marriage or a de facto relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by 
family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic 
                                                 
13  See for example the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW) s17. 
14  Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) s15(1)(e). 
15  De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA) s11(1)(d). 
16  In South Australia the duration requirement is three years unless there is a child of the 
relationship: De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA) s9(2)(c); and similarly in the Australian 
Capital Territory, it is two: Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) s12. 
17  Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s275(1).  The Victorian position was amended in 1999 to extend its 
coverage to people living in a ‘domestic relationship’, which is defined to mean ‘the relationship 
between two people who, although not married to each other, are living or have lived together as a 
couple on a genuine domestic basis (irrespective of gender).’  Similarly, the Queensland 
legislation defines de facto spouse as ‘either 1 of 2 persons, whether of the same or the opposite 
sex, who are living together as a couple’: Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s260(1). 
18  While not directly referring to couples of the same or opposite sex (or similar words), s4 defines 
‘de facto relationship’ in words broad enough to encompass same sex couples. 
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support and personal care.19  Similarly, the Australian Capital Territory statute defines 
domestic relationship as ‘a personal relationship (other than a legal marriage) between 2 
adults in which 1 provides personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic 
nature for the material benefit of the other, and includes a de facto marriage.’20  As we 
will see later, it is significant that despite these two statutes applying to a wider class of 
claimant, cases involving claims by a person formerly in a domestic relationship are rare. 
 
 
2.  Why a uniform position for de factos throughout Australia is desirable 
There are good reasons for having a uniform scheme that applies to de facto couples 
across Australia.  Equity of treatment is secured, forum shopping is avoided, extra-
territorial limits are overcome, and resources are not wasted on jurisdictional issues.  
These justifications have proved strong enough to motivate the States and Territories’ 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General to agree to refer their legislative power to the 
Commonwealth regarding heterosexual and homosexual de facto couples, enabling the 
Commonwealth to enact legislation over de facto couples.21  The Commonwealth has 
indicated its acceptance of the referral regarding heterosexual de factos, so that 
uniformity regarding them can be achieved.22  However, the Commonwealth Attorney-
                                                 
19  Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s5(1).  Section 5(2) goes on to exclude some categories 
from the ambit of the definition.   
20  Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) s3(1).  Unlike the New South Wales legislation, however, 
the statute does not define the term ‘de facto marriage’. 
21  At the November 2002 meeting of the Standing Committee, agreement was only reached in 
principle, because Victoria’s government was in caretaker mode and could not approve the 
proposal.  Formal agreement requires unanimous vote of State, Territory and Commonwealth 
governments: CCH Australia, ‘De facto relationship law – States agree in principle to refer power 
to Commonwealth’, 11 November 2002, 
 <http://www.cch.com.au/fe_news.asp?document_id=28061&topic_code=2>. 
22  Under the Commonwealth Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament has power to legislate 
about matters on which States refer their legislative powers to the Commonwealth: s51(xxxvii).  
Either as individual States or as a coalition of States, States have in the past referred their 
legislative powers to the Commonwealth to secure consistency across jurisdictions in areas 
governed by legislation where consistency is desirable.  Examples of referrals of State power 
include the referral of power in the family law domain, demonstrating the desirability of uniform 
legal regulation of family law.  The States referred their legislative power regarding the 
maintenance, custody and guardianship of ex-nuptial children: Commonwealth Powers (Family 
Law – Children) Act 1986 (NSW), with counterparts in 1986 (Vic), 1986 (SA), 1987 (Tas), 1990 
(Qld).  The Corporations Law is another example of jurisdictions acting together to ensure 
consistent legislation operating throughout Australia.  Australian Law Reform Commissions are 
also currently reviewing succession laws with a view to enacting consistent regime.   
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General has so far rejected the States’ referral regarding homosexual de facto couples.23  
Since agreement exists regarding heterosexual de facto couples, we will simply 
summarize the case for uniformity here, taking it as a point of departure for the argument 
concerning homosexual de facto couples. 
 
Equity of treatment 
There are no relevant jurisdiction-specific differences that justify different legislative 
provisions across States and Territories.  The reason for this is that in this context, the 
major interests law must satisfy are the parties’ economic interests.  As well, the large 
number of breakdowns of de facto relationships means that the incidence of unjust results 
is not so small that it could be excused on grounds such as the logistical difficulty of 
changing the law.  This is an overriding consideration of justice since there are now so 
many de facto couples, and because the number of couples is increasing (with a likely 
increase in the number of breakdowns).   
 
Injustice is created by statutory inconsistencies, especially concerning whether 
prospective needs are considered.  Different outcomes are produced for de facto couples 
in different jurisdictions.  Particularly unjust results are created in cases where the party 
seeking an adjustment has been the homemaker who has left employment to raise 
children, has not contributed to the relationship directly in a financial sense, and whose 
partner has remained employed and accumulated assets in his or her name only.  In 
Queensland, the court considers the same circumstances as if the homemaker were 
married, including the parties’ respective financial positions, future needs and any other 
circumstances the court considers appropriate to take into account.24  However, in New 
South Wales, future needs are not considered.  The applicant would clearly receive a 
more favourable property settlement in Queensland. 
 
Forum shopping 
                                                 
23  A Hodge, ‘Family court bias is ‘homophobic’ ’, Weekend Australian, 27-28 July 2002, 7.  A 
spokesperson for the Commonwealth Attorney-General is reported to have said that ‘the 
Commonwealth regards same-sex couples as being in a different situation to heterosexual 
couples’: ‘Gay couples left out of court shift’, The Age, 8 March 2002. 
24  Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s306. 
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The product of inconsistent legal positions is not only the creation of economic injustice.  
In pursuing their economic interests, applicants may understandably attempt to bring 
proceedings in the most accommodating jurisdiction.  It is not uncommon for couples to 
settle in more than one place during the course of their relationship.  A former de facto 
partner therefore may be able to satisfy the relevant nexus requirements of more than one 
de facto relationships statute.  Suppose a de facto couple live in New South Wales for 5 
years, then move to Queensland for a further 5 year period.  They separate, the de facto 
wife returning to New South Wales while the de facto husband remains in Queensland.  
The de facto wife wishes to apply for a property adjustment order.  An application can be 
brought in New South Wales only if either or both parties lived in New South Wales on 
the day the application was made, and if both parties lived in New South Wales for a 
substantial period of their relationship,25 or made substantial contributions of a specified 
kind.26  In this example, the nexus requirements would be met. 
 
Unlike most other jurisdictions, Queensland’s statute does not contain an express nexus 
requirement.  Therefore, the common law ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test applies.27 
Here, it is likely that the de facto wife would also satisfy the common law test applicable 
in Queensland, so could commence proceedings there.  Her legal advisor therefore would 
need to consider the likely outcomes in each jurisdiction, and predict which jurisdiction 
would offer the most favourable property order.  If the de facto wife were the homemaker 
with substantial future financial needs, whose income earning capacity had been affected 
by the relationship, Queensland would be the preferred forum. 
 
It is undesirable for litigants to forum shop in this manner.  At the very least, it brings the 
legal system into disrepute in the eyes of the community.  It defies principles of justice 
that an applicant should receive different treatment depending on the jurisdiction.  
                                                 
25  ‘Substantial period’ means a period equivalent to at least one-third of the duration of the 
relationship: Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s15(2). 
26  Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s15(1). 
27  Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538.  This test has been applied in the 
family law context: Henry v Henry (1995) 185 CLR 571; In Marriage of Gilmore (1993) 16 Fam 
LR 285; Ferrier-Watson and McElrath (2000) 26 Fam LR 169. 
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Litigants should be entitled to receive comparable or consistent outcomes regardless of 
the jurisdiction.   
 
Extra-territorial limitations of court powers 
The powers conferred on courts under the various statutes are generally extensive.28  
However, difficulties may arise where the parties have real property outside the 
jurisdiction in which the application to adjust property interests is brought.  In a case 
where a couple resides for substantial periods of their relationship in more than one 
jurisdiction, it is possible that real property has been acquired in each jurisdiction.  If the 
application to adjust property interests is brought in Queensland, the court may want to 
order that both the New South Wales and Queensland properties be sold and the proceeds 
be divided between the parties in a specified way.  While such an order will be binding 
on the parties themselves, if the party owning the real property in New South Wales fails 
to comply with the order, enforcing the order to sell is likely to be more complicated and 
therefore more costly for the enforcing party than if the real property were located in 
Queensland.  These costs could be avoided if a uniform approach were taken to de facto 
relationships reform.   
 
Resources wasted on jurisdictional issues 
Where the laws of the States and Territories differ and there is scope for an application to 
be brought in more than one jurisdiction, establishing and enforcing property rights has 
the potential to be time-consuming, complex and costly.  First, the legal practitioner will 
need to advise the client on the range of possible outcomes under the various legal 
regimes that could potentially govern the matter.  Second, in the scenario suggested 
earlier, just as it may be more advantageous for the de facto wife to bring the application 
in Queensland, it may be in the de facto husband’s interest for the matter to be 
determined in New South Wales.  If the nexus requirements of the New South Wales 
legislation are met, the respondent may wish to challenge the Queensland Court’s 
                                                 
28  Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s38; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), s291; De Facto 
Relationships Act 1991 (NT), s37; Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s25; De Facto 
Relationships Act 1996 (SA), s10; De Facto Relationship Act 1999 (Tas), s30; Property Law Act 
1974 (Qld), s333. 
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jurisdiction and contend that New South Wales is the appropriate forum in which to bring 
the application.  Third, depending on the facts of the case, there may be legal argument 
about which law the court should or is able to apply, and the extent of its power should 
assets be located out of the jurisdiction.  Determination of such jurisdictional issues 
incurs cost to both parties, which would be avoided under a uniform system where the 
place of commencing proceedings is immaterial.  Finally, if the order relates to assets 
outside the jurisdiction, additional expense in registering that judgment elsewhere may, in 
some cases, need to be incurred.   
 
Arguments for a uniform legal framework are compelling, and the existing regime cannot 
be supported because it does not deliver consistent and just results.  Agreement to the 
referral of legislative power by the States and Territories demonstrates this.  Debate 
should now focus on the model designed to replace the current situation. 
 
 
3.  Why the legal protection of married couples’ economic interests on relationship 
breakdown should be extended to de factos  
We argue that the uniform scheme should adequately protect economic interests and 
should therefore replicate the Family Law Act provisions, which already operate in three 
States.  The recognition of nonfinancial contributions and the consideration of future 
economic needs are necessary elements of a justifiable scheme for de factos, for the same 
reasons as they are required components of the scheme applying to married couples.  For 
relevant purposes in this context – the protection of economic interests, and the 
promotion of justice – individuals in de facto relationships possess interests identical to 
married couples.  The same point applies in diverse legal areas such as insurance, 
taxation, social security, and succession.  Law’s task is, wherever possible, to treat the 
legal, social and economic interests of individuals in de facto relationships with the same 
justice as it treats the interests of individuals in marriages.  Law must be able to provide 
justifiable economic outcomes for the parties on the breakdown of their relationship, 
including the provision of justifiable adjustments to property interests. 
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There may be some opposition to this stance.  It is recognized that there are arguments 
for maintaining a general legal distinction between the treatment of de facto couples and 
married couples.  There is an argument that marriage should be protected as a socially 
beneficial institution, that to treat de facto relationships equally would endorse them as 
being of equal merit to marriages, and that law should promote marriage for society’s 
benefit.29  We disagree with this position.  First, religious views about the formalization 
of a relationship should not be imposed on citizens because to do so infringes the 
individual’s freedom of religion.  Second, marriage does not necessarily confer maximum 
benefits on either the individuals in it, their children (if any), or society.  It is the 
substance of a relationship that matters rather than its form.  We agree with other 
commentators that the quality and durability of a relationship and of any parent-child 
relationships that may spring from it (noting that more and more couples are not having 
children now),30 are a product of the individuals’ qualities and the qualities of their 
relationship, not whether their commitment has been solemnized in a marriage 
ceremony.31  Evidence from the Australian community indicates that the majority of 
people agree with this view.32  Rather than relying on the imagined advantages of a 
marriage ceremony to secure strong, satisfying, durable relationships, far more could be 
achieved to enhance the qualities of adult relationships and parent-child relationships by 
educating children and adults about them and encouraging the development of personal 
and emotional attributes that contribute to high quality relationships.  Third, it is the law’s 
function to remedy injustices suffered by individuals, and these remedies should not be 
withheld from those who choose not to accept a particular religious value.  The interests 
                                                 
29  See for example, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 36, De Facto Relationships, 
1983, [5.49-5.50]: http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R36CHP5.  See also L Waite, 
‘Does marriage matter?’ (1995) 32 Demography, 4, November, 483-507. 
30  The fertility rate has declined from 1.91 children per female in 1991 to 1.75 in 2001: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends 2002 Family – National summary tables, 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad4…/ea57eeffc3a6f5ebca256bcd008272e6!O
penDocument>. 
31  See for example E Evatt, R Watson and D McKenzie, ‘The Legal and Social Aspects of 
Cohabitation and The Reconstituted Family as Social Problems’ in J Eekelaar and S Katz (eds) 
Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies, 1980, 399, cited in the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission, Report 36, De Facto Relationships, [5.44]. 
32  D De Vaus, ‘Family Values in the Nineties’, (1997) 48 Family Matters, Spring/Summer, 5, 7. 
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protected by the law’s remedies here are not dependent on religious affiliation but on 
economic and personal circumstance.33 
 
There is an argument that de facto couples might not want the Family Law Act scheme 
applied to them, it being predicated on a somewhat different image of a relationship.  
This is the freedom of choice argument: that it is not just to force the laws of marriage on 
those who have not chosen them.34  However, this objection is easily accommodated.  
Any de facto couple who want to determine their own distribution of property on 
relationship breakdown are free to do so.  The legislation does not automatically apply to 
determine the distribution of property, but is merely an avenue of relief when a 
disadvantaged party is denied a just outcome.  The purpose is to remedy particular 
injustices and hardships; in this context, to parties in relationships marked by role 
division whose economic interests are jeopardized, and to parties whose contributions to 
the relationship may not be adequately recognized.  The legislation is not intended to 
equate de facto couples with married couples for all purposes.  Moreover, three 
jurisdictions already have seen fit to adopt the Family Law Act scheme.  A defendant who 
is the subject of a property adjustment order in any of the three current jurisdictions, or 
under the envisaged scheme, may well be disgruntled with the rights of the weaker party 
being protected, but this is not a reason to deny justice to those in need of it. 
 
Finally, we accept that there do tend to be some sociological differences between the two 
relationships.  Evidence suggests that de facto relationships are less stable than marriages, 
that couples are less likely to pool financial resources, and that de factos are more likely 
to have egalitarian views of gender roles and division of labour.35  However, these 
differences do not merit denying redress to de facto individuals who need it.  The 
argument remains that in this context it is the primacy of economic interests and the 
interests of justice that are the relevant interests law must respond to.  For relevant 
                                                 
33  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 36, De Facto Relationships, above n 29, 
[5.45-5.47]. 
34  Ibid [5.51-5.55].  It is doubtful whether marrying couples ‘choose’ the laws applying to them, in 
any case: see R Parker, ‘How partners in long-term relationships view marriage’, (2000) 55 
Family Matters, Autumn, 74, 80. 
35  H Glezer, ‘Cohabitation and Marriage Relationships in the 1990s’, (1997) 47 Family Matters, 
Winter, 5, 6-8. 
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purposes, the sociological differences in some de facto relationships from the archetypal 
marriage do not detract from this argument for uniformity.  Qualifying de facto couples 
are in fact a couple, one of whom in particular will sometimes possess identical interests 
and circumstances to those activating the Family Law Act provisions.  True, the de facto 
relationship will lack the de jure formal status of marriage that comes from participation 
in a ceremony, but the relevant substantial interests are the same.  Moreover, there are 
undoubtedly many de facto relationships that more closely conform to the image of a 
‘marriage’ than do many marriages.  The fact that some de facto relationships, of 
whatever sexuality, have different features of role division and dependency to that 
envisaged of a ‘traditional’ marriage does not detract from the argument that some 
individuals in these de facto relationships need to have their economic interests protected 
by law.36  The interests of those without this need are not unjustifiably affected. 
 
For these reasons we conclude that on this issue, the scheme for de factos should mirror 
that applying to married couples, since the relevant interests of the disadvantaged parties 
are the same as their married counterparts’ interests.  The next major issue that arises is 
whether the new scheme should apply to homosexual de facto relationships. 
 
 
4.  Should the new uniform regime apply to homosexual de facto couples? 
The referrals of legislative power demonstrate that the States and Territories agree the 
most justifiable approach is to create uniform treatment for all de facto couples.  
Furthermore, legislation in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia 
and the Australian Capital Territory already places homosexual de facto relationships on 
equal terms with heterosexual de facto relationships. 
 
By excluding homosexuals from the scheme, the Commonwealth promotes a divisive 
position, which creates economic injustice and inequality, as well as potentially 
                                                 
36  Other commentators have noted this point: see for example J Millbank, ‘The De Facto 
Relationships Amendment Bill 1998 (NSW): The Rationale for Law Reform, (1999) 8 
Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal, 1, 11; S Boyd, ‘Expanding the “Family” in Family 
Law: Recent Ontario Proposals on Same Sex Relationships’, (1994) 7 CJWL/RFD, 545, 552. 
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contributing to anti-homosexual sentiment.  The Commonwealth has not justified its 
position, except to say that different considerations apply to same-sex couples (without 
explaining why).37  This silence may be explicable because, beyond being motivated by 
bias against homosexuality, it is difficult to produce good reasons for granting justice to 
one group of de facto couples, but not to another, purely on the basis of their sexuality.  
The silence of the Australian Government about its preference for heterosexuals and its 
disparate treatment of homosexuals is all the more confronting when compared with the 
recent New Zealand legislative initiatives in this context.  The Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976 (NZ), from 1 February 2002, puts all de facto couples, whether heterosexual or 
homosexual, in the same position as married couples for the purposes of property 
distribution on the breakdown of a relationship.38  The decision of the New Zealand 
Parliament to include de facto couples (of whatever sexuality) in the property division 
regime was achieved by a slender majority of four votes.  Significantly, after that 
decision, the vote to include homosexual de facto couples in the regime was achieved by 
an overwhelming majority of 41.39   
 
This development in New Zealand continues a trend that is emerging both overseas and 
in Australian States and Territories.  In many European countries, the economic interests 
of de facto couples are protected, with no discrimination based on sexuality.40  In the 
                                                 
37  See above, n 23. 
38  The definition of de facto couples expressly includes both heterosexual and homosexual couples: 
s2D(1).  New Zealand’s position promotes a starting point of equality: save specified exceptions, 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 provides that spouses share equally in the matrimonial 
home and family chattels on the breakdown of the marriage.  The stated purpose of the legislation 
is to recognize the equal contribution of husband and wife to the marriage, and of the de facto 
partners to the de facto relationship; and to provide for a just division of the relationship property 
when the relationship ends by separation: Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (NZ) s1M.  Section 
1N defines the principles guiding the achievement of these purposes: men and women have equal 
status, and their equality should be maintained and enhanced; all forms of contribution to the 
marriage partnership, or the de facto relationship partnership, are treated as equal; a just division 
of relationship property has regard to the economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses or 
de facto partners arising from their marriage or de facto relationship or from the ending of their 
marriage or de facto relationship; and questions about relationship property should be resolved as 
inexpensively, simply, and speedily as is consistent with justice. 
39  See B Atkin, ‘Property Changes in New Zealand’, (2001) 15 Australian Journal of Family Law, 
90, 90-91. 
40  Many European countries have a statutory regime to protect economic interests, under which 
couples may choose to register their relationship, including Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Sweden and Hungary: see L Wardle, 
 15
United Kingdom, two Private Members Bills have recently been introduced, both 
providing for the registration of heterosexual and homosexual non-married relationships, 
with attendant legal rights and obligations.41  In Canada, a recent Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal decision held that legislation excluding unmarried couples from statutory rights to 
division of family property on relationship breakdown violated the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms because it discriminated against de facto couples on the basis of 
marital status.42  As well, there are numerous other examples of legislation in Australian 
States that recognize homosexual de facto relationships and treat the individuals in them 
in the same way that individuals in heterosexual de facto relationships are treated.43   
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Same-Sex Marriage and the limits of Legal Pluralism’, in J Eekelaar and T Nhlapo (eds) The 
Changing Family: International Perspectives On The Family And Family Law, 1998, Hart, 
Oxford, 381, 386-387; see also generally I Lund-Andersen, ‘Cohabitation and Registered 
Partnership in Scandinavia: The Legal Position of Homosexuals’, in J Eekelaar and T Nhlapo 
(eds) The Changing Family: International Perspectives On The Family And Family Law, 1998, 
Hart, Oxford, 397.  In most of these countries, the legislation regulates property distribution 
should the relationship end, with the statutes differing in the extent to which the provisions reflect 
the legal position for married couples.  Consequences of registration attach only if the couple 
chooses to register, so a partner in an unregistered relationship will not enjoy the same property 
rights.  This optional model preserves the autonomy of the couple to choose how it wishes to be 
treated - as a married couple, registered couple, or unregistered couple.  A defect is that those in 
unregistered relationships may suffer injustice on the relationship breakdown.   
41  The Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill) and the Civil Partnerships Bill respectively.  For a 
summary of the current position in the United Kingdom and a discussion of reform options, see 
House of Commons Research Paper 02/17, ‘The Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill and the 
Civil Partnerships Bill’, 19 March 2002.  The Law Society has also proposed reform, advocating a 
two-tier system: couples of any sexual orientation who register are conferred with rights and 
obligations akin to married couples: ‘Cohabitation: The case for clear law; Proposals for Reform’, 
July 2002.  Under the Society’s proposals, non-registering couples would also be entitled to obtain 
an adjustment of property and financial rights on the breakdown of their relationship, although not 
to the same degree as if their relationship were registered.  The Solicitors Family Law Association 
also urges legislation conferring rights on couples on relationship breakdown: Solicitors Family 
Law Association Fact Sheets, ‘Reforming the law on cohabitation’: 
<http://www.sfla.co.uk/factsheetdisplay>.   
42  Walsh v Bona (2000) 186 DLR (4th) 50.  This decision has been appealed and the decision is 
pending.  If the decision is upheld, then presumably family law statutes will need to be amended to 
extend property rights to heterosexual and same sex de facto couples.  Although this point has 
never before been tested in the Supreme Court, two earlier decisions of the Court suggest that the 
appeal may not succeed.  In 1995, the Court held in Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418 that 
insurance legislation in Ontario that required insurers to extend automobile accident benefits to 
husbands and wives of insured persons but not de facto couples violated the constitutional 
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of marital status.  In 1999 in M v H [1999] 2 SCR 3, 
considering entitlement to spousal support under the Ontario Family Law Act, the Court held that 
the term ‘de facto relationship’ could not exclude same sex couples as this also breached the 
Canadian Charter.  As a result, the Ontario legislation was amended to include same-sex couples.   
43  See, for example, Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (new s13A(3)); Statute Law Amendment 
(Relationships) Act 2001 (Vic); Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld); Domestic Violence (Family 
Protection) Act 1989 (Qld); Victims Compensation Act 1996 (NSW); Administration and Probate 
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Underpinning these developments regarding the property rights of homosexuals is a core 
legislative commitment to individuals’ equality before the law. State legislation in all 
Australian jurisdictions prohibits discrimination against individuals on the basis of their 
lawful sexual activity or sexual orientation.44  It is no longer acceptable to discriminate 
purely on grounds of sexuality without other compelling justification.  All these recent 
legislative positions are motivated by recognizing empirical evidence of the incidence of 
homosexual de facto relationships, and by accepting the responsibility to make justifiable 
legislative provision for those individuals’ interests.  
 
Because of their acceptance of the need to provide legal equality wherever possible to 
homosexual people, the States have condemned the Commonwealth’s position.45  
Victoria’s Attorney-General, Rob Hulls, attacked the Commonwealth position as 
promoting prejudice against homosexuals in the face of State efforts to eradicate 
discrimination, citing Victoria’s extensive legislation (over 40 statutes) ending 
discrimination on grounds of sexuality.  Queensland’s Attorney-General, Rod Welford, 
thought the Commonwealth’s position created manifest discrimination and injustice: ‘to 
deny the existence of same-sex couples in permanent domestic relationships is a nonsense 
and grossly unjust.’46   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Act 1929 (ACT).  The Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Act 2001 (WA) (assented 
to on 17 April 2002, to commence on proclamation) amended the following statutes in Western 
Australia: Interpretation Act 1984 (the new s13A provides that for all Western Australian statutes, 
‘de facto relationship’ includes couples of the same sex); Administration Act 1903; Adoption Act 
1994; Artificial Conception Act 1985; Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 1998; Cremation Act 
1929; Equal Opportunity Act 1984; Family Court Act 1997; Guardianship and Administration Act 
1990; Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991; Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982; 
Inheritance (Family and Dependants Provision) Act 1972; Law Reform (Decriminalisation of 
Sodomy) Act 1989; Members of Parliament (Financial Interests) Act 1992; Parliamentary 
Superannuation Act 1970; Public Trustee Act 1941; State Superannuation Act 2000. 
44  Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s6(d) and (l); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s7(l); Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s49ZG; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s29(3); Anti-
Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s16(c) and (d); Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s19(c); 
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s7(1)(b).  The Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) has recently 
been amended by the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Act 2001 (WA) to have a 
similar effect: see, for example, s35O. 
45  Hodge, above n 23. 
46  Ibid. 
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The Commonwealth is caught in a trap.  Its willingness to extend the current position for 
married couples to heterosexual de facto couples is a forced concession, motivated not 
just by pressure from the States, but also by the lack of good reasons not to provide a just 
and equal system for heterosexual individuals in de facto relationships.  If legislation is 
not extended to heterosexual de facto couples, the Commonwealth is permitting 
discrimination against people on the basis of their marital status to produce manifest 
injustice, with no substantive or defensible advantage.47  So, the Commonwealth accepts 
that it is justifiable and desirable to treat heterosexual de facto couples in the same way as 
it treats married couples to protect individuals’ economic interests on the dissolution of a 
relationship. 
 
Once this position is reached, the Commonwealth has no defensible position excluding 
homosexual individuals from the regime.  Extending the system for married couples to 
heterosexual de facto couples implicitly accepts that it is unjust that de facto couples be 
treated in a way differently from married couples when that system creates injustice.  It 
also accepts that the function of the law here is to promote just economic outcomes when 
relationships break down, and that this function should be extended to all couples in 
relationships of a certain quality and duration, regardless of their marital status.  The 
consequence of this position is that if it is just to place heterosexual de facto couples in 
the same position as married couples for this purpose, then it is also just to place 
homosexual de facto couples in that position.  The reason for this is that the sexuality of 
the two people in the de facto relationship is irrelevant to their economic needs and 
justifiable entitlements under a just legal scheme when their relationship breaks down.  If 
the Commonwealth restricts the legislation’s application to heterosexual de facto couples, 
then it is making an irrelevant discriminatory distinction based solely on lawful sexual 
activity.  It would be just as unjustifiable for the Commonwealth to restrict the regime to 
individuals in de facto relationships who are left-handed. 
 
                                                 
47  Section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) prohibits discrimination against people on the 
basis of their marital status; although due to its plenary legislative power the Commonwealth is 
entitled to enact legislation that is inconsistent with earlier legislation, the Commonwealth would 
be offending the spirit of its own anti-discrimination legislation.   
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Such a discriminatory distinction produces injustice because the economic interests of 
parties on the breakdown of a relationship are identical regardless of their sexuality.  The 
purpose of the law in this context is to provide an equitable regime for property 
distribution and adjustment on the breakdown of relationships.  If people in a particular 
group are excluded from a justifiable regime and are left to suffer inappropriate outcomes 
in contrast to their counterparts because of the irrelevant consideration of different 
sexuality, then the law is unjust.  Such a legal position would fail crucial tests of a law’s 
justifiability, which is to promote social welfare, and to provide consistency amongst like 
individual cases.48   
 
A rights-based argument for extending the scheme to homosexuals 
To safeguard the economic interests of vulnerable parties, to simplify the application of 
law, and to achieve further legislative and community acceptance of homosexuality are 
themselves sufficiently important reasons for extending the regime to homosexuals.  
However, there is an even stronger, more fundamental reason for doing so.  As the 
guardians of a liberal democracy, the Australian Government claims to promote liberal 
ideals such as justice, freedom, individual rights, and equality before the law.  It has a 
responsibility to uphold these ideals in its legislation and policies unless there is a 
competing interest or obligation that can justifiably be preferred.  If a fundamental right 
such as the right to be treated as an equal is to be interfered with, then that interference 
must be demonstrably justifiable.  Here, the Commonwealth’s preferred approach 
involves an unjustifiable incursion on the fundamental rights of some economically 
vulnerable individuals in a liberal society; that is, those in homosexual de facto 
relationships who may suffer unjust economic outcomes, in contrast to their heterosexual 
or married counterparts.49 
                                                 
48  Other commentators have also noted this point: see, for example, R Bailey-Harris, above n 15, 
263.  Bailey-Harris thinks that the same model of property division should apply to all 
cohabitation relationships whether married or de facto, because of the core need the law must 
address: justifiable economic outcomes in light of the characteristics of the relationship, the 
contributions made by the parties to it, and their relative positions at its end.  See too R Bailey-
Harris, ‘Financial Rights in Relationships outside Marriage: A Decade of Reforms in Australia’ 
(1995) 9 International Journal of Law and the Family 233, 240-253. 
49  When the New South Wales legislation was being discussed in 1999, the Attorney-General Jeff 
Shaw said ‘In an open and liberal society there is no excuse for discrimination against individuals 
in our community based on their sexual preference.  To deny couples in intimate and ongoing 
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A central tenet of liberalism is that all individuals have rights, including the right to be 
treated as political equals.  For Ronald Dworkin, the prominent liberal scholar, the 
essential characteristic of political institutions that claim to respect individuals’ rights is 
that they accept the human dignity and political equality of all individuals.50   For 
Dworkin, respecting human dignity presupposes that it is unjust to treat someone as less 
than a full member of the human community.  To achieve this respect for human dignity 
and political equality, Dworkin emphasizes every individual’s fundamental right to be 
treated with equal concern and respect.51  Taking these rights as a starting point, in this 
context we can draw some strong conclusions about what position a liberal government 
can and cannot justifiably assume. 
 
The right to be treated with concern means that the State must treat its citizens as human 
beings who are capable of suffering and frustration.52  The right to be treated with equal 
concern means that the State must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the 
basis that some citizens are entitled to more of something because they are worthy of 
more concern.  The State must not treat people unequally purely on the ground that one 
conception of the good life is superior to another.53   
 
Related with this right to equal concern is the right to be treated with respect.  This 
embodies the liberal promise that the individual’s private life and private choices are best 
decided by the individual.  The right to be treated with respect means that the State must 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationships within the gay and lesbian community the same rights as heterosexual de facto 
couples is clearly anomalous’: cited in Hon Justice M Kirby, ‘Same Sex Relationships – Some 
Australian Legal Developments’, (1999) 19 Australian Bar Review 4, 10. 
50  R Dworkin (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 198-199.  See also R Dworkin 
(1985) A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 187-192, 359-372. 
51  Since this argument, Dworkin has framed the right as being the right to equal concern: see, for 
example, R Dworkin  (1986) Law’s Empire, Belknap, Cambridge, 200-201; and more recently, R 
Dworkin (2002) Sovereign Equality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1-2, 6-7.  This 
rephrasing makes no substantive difference to our argument.  In Sovereign Equality, Dworkin 
argues that the right to equal concern is respected if government adopts laws and policies that 
ensure that citizens’ fates are insensitive to who they otherwise are (homosexual, for example), as 
far as possible; and, if government attempts, as far as possible, to make citizens’ fates sensitive to 
their choices: 6. 
52  Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 272. 
53  Of course, some inequalities in goods and opportunities are necessary in a liberal state, but only 
when justified by some reason beyond individual difference in private life.   
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treat its citizens as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent 
conceptions of how to live their lives.54 
 
As liberal theorists accept, coexisting with these objects is the necessity when justified 
for governments to create and permit inequalities in goods and opportunities and 
liberties.55  Dworkin makes the useful distinction between two rights that could be 
viewed as part of the right to equal concern and respect.  The right to equal concern and 
respect must include the fundamental right to be treated as a political equal, and it may 
also include the subsidiary right to equal treatment.  These are two different rights, and 
the fact that homosexual individuals in this context possess both rights is significant. 
  
In this context, individuals in homosexual de facto relationships have the right to be 
treated as political equals.  This fundamental right of the individual to be treated as an 
equal is the right to be treated by the State with the same respect and concern as anyone 
else when the State is making a decision about how goods and opportunities are to be 
distributed.  When a political decision is being made, those whose interests will be 
affected have the right that their interests will be considered, and their prospective loss be 
taken into account, in the process of deciding if the general interest is best served by the 
proposed position.56   
 
Homosexual individuals have the right to be treated by the Commonwealth Government 
with equal concern and respect when it considers whether to extend the regime to them.  
Because of the right to be treated with equal concern, the Commonwealth must recognize 
and consider these individuals’ capacity for economic and other suffering that will flow 
from an unfavourable decision. Because of the right to be treated with equal respect, 
homosexual individuals should not (without justifiable reasons) be excluded from 
receiving the benefits or opportunities made available to others simply because of their 
lifestyle.  The Commonwealth Government must respect the self-regarding private 
lifestyle and choices made by these individuals; it cannot justifiably exclude homosexuals 
                                                 
54  Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 272. 
55  See, for example, Taking Rights Seriously, 273. 
56  Ibid 273. 
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from the scheme due to this fundamental right of homosexuals to treatment as equals in 
this decision-making process.   
 
As a right that may sometimes be derived from this fundamental right to be treated as 
political equals in the decision making process, the right to equal treatment is the right in 
a particular case to an equal distribution of an opportunity, resource or burden: for 
example, the right of every individual to one vote of equal value.57  This right only 
crystallizes in some circumstances.  For example, individuals do not have the right to 
actual equal treatment in the allocation of places in medical school; nobody can simply 
assert the right to receive a place in medical school.58   
 
Here, we argue that homosexual individuals are entitled to actual equal treatment to that 
given to heterosexuals in the application of a legal scheme designed to protect economic 
interests.  The argument for extending the scheme is all the stronger when one considers 
that the right to be treated with equal concern and respect here embraces the right to equal 
treatment as well as the primary right of treatment as a political equal.  Consider two de 
facto couples of differing sexual orientation whose relationships have broken down.  In 
each relationship, an economically disadvantaged party has identical economic interests 
and needs arising from an identical dispute.  Treatment as political equals is achieved if, 
when designing the law that applies to each couple, the decision makers consider all the 
individuals who will be affected by the law with equal concern and respect.  Equal 
treatment is achieved if both individuals have made available to them the same 
mechanisms and entitlements for resolving the dispute and securing their economic 
interests and needs.  Here, the Australian Government is not treating its citizens with 
equal concern and respect.  The Commonwealth is unjustifiably offending the right of 
individuals to treatment as political equals, and the right of individuals to equal treatment. 
 
                                                 
57  Ibid 227. 
58  The authors adapt this example from Dworkin’s: see Taking Rights Seriously, 227. 
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Utility 
Can the Commonwealth support its position by arguing that another reason overrides the 
defence of individual rights to equal concern and respect?  The importance of individual 
rights in liberal society is that they overcome political decisions that are made without 
sufficient reason.  Individual rights as political trumps59 can only be justifiably interfered 
with when there is a collective community goal of sufficiently compelling urgency to 
deny the individual what their right demands (a justification of policy), or when a 
competing individual right can justifiably be preferred (a justification of principle).60   
  
There is no competing individual right worthy of priority.  Nor in this context is there a 
collective community goal sufficient to override the upholding of individual rights.  If 
there was such an argument of policy, it would still have to be of sufficiently compelling 
weight to interfere with the individual’s right to equality.  Furthermore, because 
individual rights to political equality are being interfered with, having economic and 
social consequences, then the Commonwealth would be obliged to give reasons for its 
decision.  Here, the Commonwealth has not explained its position; the only motive we 
can assume is that the Commonwealth holds what Dworkin terms an external preference.  
This preference is that homosexual individuals do not deserve equality in this context, but 
deserve to be treated in a less than equal manner, and so do not deserve to be included in 
the scheme.   
 
A utilitarian basis for a policy may rely on the majority of individuals considering that a 
policy creates beneficial consequences for them personally.  This self-regarding 
preference for a policy is motivated by the majority of individuals calculating the 
outcome of the policy for themselves; a personal preference.61   If the majority’s personal 
preference is about a matter of compelling urgency, that collective personal preference 
may be sufficient to justifiably override the right of an individual or group of individuals. 
 
                                                 
59  Ibid xi. 
60  Ibid 274. 
61  On personal and external preferences, see Taking Rights Seriously, 234-238.  The personal 
preference in effect says ‘I myself want this for me.  The external preference says ‘I myself do not 
want those other people to have that.’ 
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However, such a justifiable interference in the rights of individuals may not emanate 
from an external preference.  An external preference is an individual’s calculation about 
what benefits and outcomes flow from the policy to certain others.62  Utilitarian 
arguments informed by external preferences, even the external preferences of the 
majority, do not justify policy because they treat individuals in the ‘other’ group with less 
than equal concern and respect.  The external preference and the preferred policy is 
motivated not by a policy’s direct impact on the individuals themselves, but because the 
alternative offends their view of others and their perception of another’s way of life.  In 
doing this, there is a breach of equal concern and respect for others.   
 
Here, the Commonwealth’s external preference appears to be being given weight, 
adversely affecting homosexuals because their personal lives are viewed with less respect 
by parties whose own personal interests are not directly engaged.  To anyone holding the 
Commonwealth’s view, it makes no personal difference if homosexuals in de facto 
relationships are able to resolve the economic issues on the breakdown of their 
relationship in the same way as do those in a heterosexual relationship.  It merely offends 
their view of a desirable type of relationship if people in those relationships are treated in 
a certain way.  By counting external preferences, the utilitarian argument for justified 
policy fails, because by counting irrelevant additional considerations it is not simply 
counting personal interests. 
 
The Australian Government bears the onus of defending its position.  Differential 
treatment requires compelling justification if it produces inequality.  Rather than being a 
product of liberal ideals of equality before the law, the Commonwealth’s position appears 
to be motivated by bias against the perceived inferiority of a minority group; by external 
preferences.  This particular external preference against homosexuals has long been a 
hallmark of legal principle that, although diminishing with society’s acceptance that 
homosexuality is a normal variant of human sexuality, still influences lawmakers.63 
 
                                                 
62  Ibid 275. 
63  See, for example, the discussion in M Thornton (1990) The Liberal Promise, Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 83-87. 
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Australia’s obligations under international law 
A final argument for the inclusion of same-sex de facto couples in the regime stems from 
international law’s recognition of the unacceptability of bias against homosexuals.  The 
Australian Government has obligations under international law to prevent such 
discrimination and injustice.  The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) promotes equality under the law and demands all individuals’ equal entitlement 
to legal protection.64  The ICCPR states in article 26 that ‘the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’  Article 2(1) 
secures the ICCPR’s rights to all individuals without distinction of any kind. 
 
A legislative scheme for property distribution applying to heterosexual de facto couples, 
but excluding homosexual de facto couples, is incompatible with the ICCPR because it 
creates unequal treatment solely on the basis of sexuality.  The ICCPR contains no 
explicit prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.65  However, there 
is judicial authority that the ICCPR’s prohibition on the grounds of sex includes a 
prohibition on the grounds of sexuality.  The 1994 decision of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), determining the application of Nicholas Toonen, an Australian 
citizen, held that the reference to ‘sex’ in articles 2(1) and 26 includes a reference to 
sexual orientation.66   
                                                 
64  International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York, 19 December 1966, 
entry into force 23 March 1976, entry into force for Australia 13 November 1980.  The ICCPR is 
appended to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) in Schedule 2.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948, 
promotes this same right in art 7. 
65  However, there is a strong argument that the fundamental international instruments prohibiting 
discrimination on such grounds as race, colour, gender and religion are intended to prohibit 
discrimination on other grounds including sexual orientation.  The reason for this is that these 
grounds in art 26 of the ICCPR are biological or genetic; as is sexual orientation – this reasoning 
was used by Wennergren in his individual opinion in Toonen’s Case, cited below: Individual 
opinion, Bertil Wennergren, Appendix to Communication 488/1992.  In fact, the grounds in art 26 
are not all biological, as some are matters of individual preference, such as political opinion and 
religion.  Only some of the listed characteristics are biological or genetic: race, colour, sex, 
national or social origin, birth. 
66  Communication No 488/1992: Australia, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, paragraph 8.7.  The Committee 
preferred this position to characterizing sexuality as falling within an ‘other status’ for the 
purposes of arts 2 and 26. The HRC did not consider whether art 26 had been breached here, as it 
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The applicant in Toonen sought a determination that relevant provisions of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code that criminalized private homosexual activity between males contravened 
international instruments, and made him a victim of unlawful interference with his 
privacy and discriminated against his right to equal protection of the law.  The ultimate 
purpose of gaining such a determination by the HRC was to pressure the Tasmanian and 
Commonwealth governments to repeal the legislation and guarantee the right to privacy 
in sexual activity.  The HRC held that the right to privacy in art 2(1) had been interfered 
with.  The Committee further held that adult consensual sexual activity in private falls 
within the concept of privacy, and that the applicant’s privacy had been interfered with 
by Tasmanian legislation prohibiting private homosexual acts, despite the failure to 
enforce the legislation.  In response to this decision, the Commonwealth enacted the 
Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994, for the sole purpose of implementing 
Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR art 17.  Section 4 states that sexual conduct 
between consenting adults in private is not to be the subject of arbitrary legislative 
interference. 
 
Other provisions of international law also inform an argument against the exclusion of 
homosexuals from the scheme.  Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) provides that States must take all 
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary practices 
that are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.67  In Australia in 2002, it is undeniable that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
found a breach of arts 2(1) and 17(1) – these breaches entitled the applicant to a remedy – the 
effective remedy would be repeal of the relevant provisions; cf individual opinion of Wennergren. 
67  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, done at New York, 
18 December 1979, entry into force 3 September 1981, entered into force in Australia 27 August 
1983, art 5(a). This international legal instrument does possess domestic authority in Australian 
law as CEDAW has been incorporated into Australian law by being scheduled to the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).  It should be noted, and the Commonwealth Attorney-General 
might claim, that this anti-discrimination legislation is not intended to extend to discrimination on 
the basis of lawful sexual activity.  Indeed, the term ‘de facto spouse’ is defined in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 s4 in terms limiting the meaning to a heterosexual de facto couple.  Yet 
even if art 5 of CEDAW is not intended to be directly incorporated into the Sex Discrimination Act 
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traditional custom of marriage as the dominant form of union of two adults has been 
eroded.  In Australia’s contemporary pluralistic society, it is neither appropriate nor 
morally justifiable for the State to confine legislative schemes intended to assist adults 
from dissolved relationships to stereotyped images of male and female in a traditional 
marriage unit.  Any considered opinion about the diversity of adult relationships must 
accept that it is not the sexual preferences of the individuals that creates an intimate 
domestic relationship, nor their marital status.  As property adjustment legislation 
demonstrates, it is the qualitative substance of the relationship that is the crucial factor. 
 
 
5.  Should the new uniform regime apply to other domestic relationships? 
Different considerations are relevant in deciding whether uniform legislation should 
extend to relationships besides de facto couples.  As we have seen, ‘domestic 
relationships’ are already regulated in the Australian Capital Territory and New South 
Wales.  Other Australian jurisdictions, New Zealand and the European countries that 
have regulated in this area, limit their focus to de facto relationships.  To assess whether a 
unified regime should govern this broader category of relationship, consideration should 
be given to what currently falls within the ambit of the existing models.  It is helpful to 
focus on some hypothetical examples. 
 
A sister and brother have been living together for 40 years in a house that is in 
the name of the brother only.  Both have been in paid employment all of their 
lives.  The siblings have always combined their income and provided personal 
support to each other, although the sister had always assumed a much greater 
portion of the homemaking duties. 
 
It is likely that this relationship would fall within the ambit of both the Australian Capital 
Territory and New South Wales statutes.  There has clearly been domestic support and 
personal care provided by one or each of them, satisfying the New South Wales 
                                                                                                                                                 
1984, it still has an impact in Australia under the common law.  High Court authority has 
established that the ratification of an international instrument by Australia’s executive government 
confers a legitimate expectation that the provisions of the instrument will be complied with; and 
furthermore, ratification gives a right of procedural fairness to parties who would be affected by an 
administrative decision contrary to the provision, namely, a right to argue against such a decision: 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. 
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legislation, and one has clearly provided the other with personal or financial commitment 
and support of a domestic nature for the material benefit of the other, satisfying the 
Australian Capital Territory legislation.  If this relationship broke down and the sister 
were asked to leave the house, it is likely that the sister would be eligible to claim an 
order for an interest in the brother’s property under either of these statutes.  Indeed, due 
to the pooling of income and the greater performance of home duties, the sister may have 
a strong moral claim to an interest in the property.   
 
Other cases can arise that are not as compelling.  Suppose that every week, a woman 
visits her elderly next door neighbour to give him his weekly shopping and to clean his 
house.  She has been doing this free of charge for 5 years.  For many years prior to this, 
the man had mowed the woman’s lawn, again without payment.  In New South Wales, 
the woman would not be eligible to claim a property interest because there has been no 
cohabitation; ironically, if the elderly man invited her to share his house so that she could 
avoid rent payments, she would qualify despite them not living together as a couple.  In 
contrast, as the Australian Capital Territory definition does not require cohabitation, it 
could be argued that this situation qualifies there as a domestic relationship.  The woman 
has been providing material benefit to her elderly neighbour by personal commitment and 
domestic support.  If the relationship breaks down, the woman may be eligible to claim 
an interest in the neighbour’s property. 
 
It is debatable if there are compelling social justice arguments to support the latter claim.  
The woman may have been motivated by different reasons: genuine concern, 
reciprocation of his kind deeds, or perhaps to be remembered in his will.  Regardless of 
the woman’s motivation and of whether her claim would be successful, it is questionable 
whether someone who passively accepts what he or she perceives as acts of kindness 
should later be subject to a property claim. 
 
When considering new legislation, it is important to consider whether the initiatives of 
previous enactments, such as broadening the category of relationship regulated, have 
been successful.  When amendments to the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) 
 28
were introduced into Parliament in 1999, there was little explanation about why the scope 
of the legislation needed to be broadened.  It was not suggested that there was a particular 
class of relationship that was suffering injustice.  The Attorney-General commented that 
the extension of the legislation to cover a ‘broad range of intimate relationships’ was 
‘necessary and desirable’,68 but gave no particulars of the relationships that were being 
subjected to hardship. 
 
One indicator of whether the legislation needed to be broadened to encompass domestic 
relationships is the extent to which applications are brought by such people.   Since the 
New South Wales legislation was amended in 1999, only one application to adjust 
property interests has been reported by a person claiming to be in one of these close 
personal relationships.69  In the Australian Capital Territory, no applications have been 
made.  While this may be explained on a number of grounds, for example, reluctance to 
bring an action because of uncertainty surrounding interpretation, or lack of knowledge 
of the law, it could also be that people in these relationships are not being disadvantaged. 
 
When considering reform options in this area, the Queensland Law Reform Commission 
canvassed the possibility of legislation extending to ‘sharers’, a definition suggested by 
the Commission being ‘persons who are sharing or who have shared property, including 
de facto partners, not being persons married to each other, who live or reside or have 
lived or resided together under the one roof, at least one of whom has made contributions 
of the kind referred to.’70  Even at the early stages of its review, the Commission accepted 
that legislation was needed to remedy injustice in the context of those in de facto 
relationships.  However, it was also concerned that people in other relationships could be 
disadvantaged in terms of property distribution on the breakdown of their relationship.  
The Commission gave an example of a situation in which it could be argued that the 
common law did not provide sufficient protection.  A spinster daughter lives with and 
cares for her ageing and sick mother for 20 years in the mother’s house.  The daughter 
                                                 
68  New South Wales Legislative Council Hansard, Second Reading Speech, Hon JW Shaw, 13 May 
1999. 
69  Jurd v Public Trustee [2001] NSWSC 632.   
70  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper No 36, Shared Property, 1991, 26. 
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performs all domestic functions for her mother during that time.  In the last 5 years, the 
mother’s health deteriorates and the daughter gives up her job to care for her mother full-
time.  The mother turns against her daughter and orders her to leave the house.71  The 
daughter would be defined as a sharer, and probably would satisfy the definitions in the 
Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales statutes. 
 
In the Commission’s later publications on de facto relationships reform, however, it 
recommended that legislation be limited to heterosexual and same sex de facto couples.  
The Commission’s reasons included the already adequate legal remedies for non-de facto 
sharers, the fact that inherent differences between the de facto relationship and other 
sharing relationships warranted different regulation, and the view that it was doubtful 
whether the legislation would provide a logical jurisdictional basis for relief for non-de 
facto sharers; the Commission queried whether it was logical to limit relief to situations 
where the parties lived together.72  The Queensland Parliament accepted these 
recommendations and embodied them in its amendment of the Property Law Act 1974. 
 
The Law Commission of Canada took a different approach in its recent report, ‘Beyond 
Conjugality’,73 preferring the view that the law should recognize and support a range of 
diverse adult relationships.  The Commission concluded that while the law had been 
expanding to recognize non-married couples, there had been insufficient focus on other 
close personal relationships.  It recommended a new approach when assessing existing or 
proposed laws that affect personal relationships.  In the context of property distribution 
after relationship breakdown, the need for regulation or protection should not turn on the 
couple-like nature of the relationship; it would be too narrow to legislate to protect only 
conjugal or couple-like relationships.  Academic commentators have also noted that there 
may be good reasons for the legal recognition of some non-conjugal relationships in 
certain cases, in particular, when the functional attributes of the relationship merit legal 
                                                 
71  Ibid 14. 
72  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Working Paper No 40, De Facto Relationships, 1992, 5-8. 
73  Law Commission of Canada, ‘Beyond Conjugality – Recognizing and supporting close personal 
relationships’, December 2001. 
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protection.  These functional attributes include co-residence, relationship duration, 
emotional interdependence and economic interdependence.74   
 
This functional attribute argument is similar to our argument for extending the property 
adjustment scheme in the Family Law Act to de factos.  We have argued that because in 
both marriages and de facto relationships the relevant substantive interest is identical (the 
economic interest of the weaker party), the law should apply equally to both types of 
relationship.  Consistent with this argument, we also conclude that the authors of a new 
legislative scheme should at least consider the types of other domestic relationship that 
may exhibit identical functional attributes to qualifying de facto relationships, and which 
may therefore merit the same protection.  Although domestic relationships with these 
attributes will be numerically fewer than de facto relationships, a clear argument can be 
made that some longstanding non-de facto domestic relationships may feature substantial 
economic and emotional contribution and interdependence.  Whether cohabitation is 
required or not is an issue that would need to be considered; but the argument stands that 
if such a relationship possessed identical substantive interests to those protected in 
qualifying de facto relationships, the absence of conjugality and perhaps even of 
cohabitation should not preclude relief. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Way Forward 
The fact that de facto couples of any sexual orientation should be struggling to be treated 
in the same way as their married counterparts is itself a demonstration of the malleability 
of society’s institutions.  Until barely a decade ago, the common law in Australia and 
England entitled a husband to rape his wife.75  Before that overdue advance, evolved 
individuals in de facto relationships would hardly have been clamouring to have the same 
position applied to them.   
                                                 
74  See for example B Cossman and B Ryder (2001) ‘What is Marriage-Like Like?  The Irrelevance 
of Conjugality’, 18 Canadian Journal of Family Law 269, 315-320. 
75  The common law position set down in Sir Matthew Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (1736) Volume 1, 
629, reaffirmed as late as 1949 in R v Clarke (1949) 33 Cr App R 216 and in 1954 in R v Miller 
[1954] 2 QB 282, 291-292, was finally overturned in Australia in R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, and 
in England in R v R [1992] 1 AC 599. 
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However, law has developed to recognize marriage as entitling its parties to certain rights 
within the relationship and when it breaks down.  The substance of those entitlements is a 
matter for ongoing debate and refinement in the interests of justice to both parties.  The 
extension of entitlements to parties to marriage needs to be placed in the context of the 
plasticity of our institutions, so that justice can be extended to individuals wherever 
appropriate.  Given the reduced importance now placed on marriage, and because of its 
inherent limitations, epitomized by its restriction to heterosexual individuals, law must 
adapt to changing societal conditions in the same way that institutions like marriage have 
changed to accommodate increased awareness of women’s rights.   
 
There is no reason why law should protect the economic interests of parties to marriage, 
and deny that protection to individuals in de facto relationships who also possess those 
interests.  The relevant interests of the parties are identical, and the law must respond to 
the economic substance of those interests, not to the form in which the parties have 
declared their relationship.  It is unjust to make irrelevant distinctions based on the 
formality of the marriage ceremony, especially when such discrimination results 
produces injustice.  For similar reasons, it is unjust not to protect the economic interests 
of those in homosexual de facto relationships.  Australian States and Territories agree that 
a uniform regime should apply to de facto couples regardless of sexual orientation.  The 
Commonwealth should accept this referral and legislate accordingly.   
 
Other necessary features of an appropriate regime then follow.  First, the legal framework 
must deliver certainty.  With property matters under the Family Law Act, practitioners 
can advise their clients about a likely range of outcomes with a reasonable degree of 
confidence.  This can be contrasted with the position that existed for many years under 
the New South Wales legislation.  Predictability increases the likelihood of resolving the 
matter by way of negotiation.  As well, if outcomes are predictable, less time should be 
spent in dispute and legal fees should be minimized.   
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Second, a regime should provide outcomes at minimum expense.  The rules and 
procedures are pivotal to the regime’s success.  Different practices operate in the State, 
Federal and Family Court systems.  Each set of rules is designed to streamline the 
passage of matters through the respective systems.  Practices appropriate for resolution of 
one kind of dispute may not promote speedy resolution of other kinds of matters.  Also, 
matters must be dealt with in the court best equipped to handle disputes.76   
 
Third, the legal positions must deliver a just outcome to parties in all qualifying de facto 
relationships without distinction based on sexual orientation.  Consideration should be 
given to other domestic relationships that also may warrant legal protection because of 
the presence of these interests.  The legislation must allow courts to consider all relevant 
economic interests, including a prospective component.  Caution should be drawn from 
the New South Wales legislation, which restricts the matters the court may consider.  
Despite persistent and creative judicial attempts to interpret the legislation in a liberal 
fashion,77 the restrictive effect has prevailed.78 
 
A regime that promotes these objects of certainty, economy and just outcomes is one that 
satisfies fundamental tests of law’s justifiability.  Moreover, a regime that applies to all 
individuals in qualifying de facto relationships, regardless of their sexual orientation, 
ensures that individuals are treated as political equals.  These advances would safeguard 
                                                 
76  Again, we can learn from the New South Wales experience.  In the early cases decided under the 
then De Facto Relationships Act 1984, for example, the New South Wales Supreme Court took a 
substantially different approach to valuing the homemaking contribution than that taken by the 
Family Court, a court specializing in personal disputes of this kind: see, for example, Wilcock v 
Sain (1986) 11 Fam LR 302 per Young J at 309 and 311; Vichidovongsa v Camerson (1987) DFC 
95-055 at 75,619-75,620; Brown v Byrne (1987) 12 Fam LR 35.  Compare the current approach of 
the New South Wales Supreme Court under which reliance can be placed on family law decisions: 
Black v Black (1991) 15 Fam LR 109 at 114; Linich v Gatland (1992) 15 Fam LR 596 at 609-610. 
77  See, for example, Black v Black (1991) 15 Fam LR 109 per Clarke JA of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court who suggested at 113-114 that ‘[b]eing remedial legislation it is to be accorded a 
beneficial construction’.  The high water mark of liberal interpretation was that taken by Handley 
JA (with whom Priestley JA agreed) of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Dwyer v Kaljo 
(1992) Fam LR 645 where he suggested that the focus of the court should be to make a property 
adjustment order that was ‘just and equitable’ and, to do so, reliance and expectation interests of 
the party were relevant.   
78  In 1997, a specially constituted New South Wales Court of Appeal in Evans v Marmont (1997) 21 
Fam LR 760 held (by a 3:2 majority) that a narrow interpretation of the legislation should be 
adopted, and that it was inappropriate to look at the injustice that an applicant may suffer because 
of his or her reliance on or expectations from the relationship. 
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the economic interests of a large and growing number of people, and they would embody 
and promote political equality for homosexual individuals.  The Commonwealth 
Government has the opportunity to enact legislation that secures multiple economic and 
political benefits.  It should accept this opportunity. 
